Bad thoughts: a last word

In the last instance I would like to place Whyte's rationalism in the context of a contemporary view of rationality. My attempt is sketchy but here goes. There is a sense in which his empowerment of people (vs. politicians or religion) through rationality resembles a famous view by Habermas known as the "legitimation crisis". I don't pretend to have read it, but I know that solving it Habermas' way presupposes some kind of ideal discourse based on rationality. The ideal discourse is in turn reminiscent of the Enlightenment ideal of a rational society (see: S.F. Schneck on the State/Society Dichotomy). If widely successful, Whyte's propagation of rational power to the people could increase the number of people who would engage rationally in discourse with the State. I.e., society may become a little more like this ideal rational society.

But to put my own view here in better perspective, it may be true that the requirement for discourse (between diverse realms) is the metalanguage of logic. But each realm constitutes a different language game, and has its own axioms, rules, and correct language usage. Thus if the private individual's language game (legitimated by the democratic institution's constitution etc. - I lack the legal knowledge to elaborate) includes the rule that a private individual has a right to question the state, then it may or may not be true that the state is required to respond, or respond truthfully for that matter. In particular, if it is in the State's interest to withhold the truth, to deceive the public in other words, it may well do so and attempt to find a legal clause legitimating its action.

I don't pretend this to be a conclusive proof, but suppose that the rules of one language game may provide for an inherent inconsistency in the application of its language. Such an instance would be a rule that provides for a particular language participant to lie. If another participant demands proof, and the participant that lied remains silent, i.e. does not submit proof, that participant may well still retain its position until a more opportune moment to play its next hand (in the meantime it may lose credibility with the public). Moreover, if bogus proof is submitted, its (false) case may even be strengthened for the time being. If certain desired courses of action can be legitimated through such tactics, clearly there is good reason for the interested participant to use the tactics.

In this framework, Whyte's rationality allows citizens to be better participants in a conceivable discourse (or dinner party arguments) with the state, friends, scientists - as the case may be. That is, to expose reasoning that does not bear (properly) on the issue at hand. To go further and condemn the position taken (but erroneously supported) is not by the same rationality justified. To put it differently, if politician X's plan was to get issue Y (say, poverty) higher on the political agenda, then using an argument of equivocation was justified from its point of view. Exposing it does not invalidate the attempt to push "poverty" higher on the political agenda using unconventional means (whether the means used is legal is a different matter). That is the limit of rationality.